Month: September 2013

Ok. If you don’t want any of my analysis or commentary or rants. Just the facts. Then Elop can be evaluated as Nokia CEO, for Nokia Corporate total results during his tenure. Or, because Nokia just now sold its total handset unit to Microsoft, it can be useful to see what results did Elop achieve at that handset unit (this includes both smartphones and featurephones). And lastly, since Elop did make a major change to Nokia’s largest and most profitable division, the smartphone unit, it is a detail worth considering. No more analysis, just the facts…

NOKIA CORPORATION UNDER ELOP

First 6 months – Corporate quarterly revenues up 26% from 10.0B Euro to 12.6B
Euro
Next 2.5 years – Corporate quarterly revenues down 55% from 12.6B
Euro to 5.6B Euro

First 6 months – Corporate quarterly profit up 200% from 295M
Euro to 884M Euro
Next 2.5 years – Corporate quarterly profit of 884M Euro turned
into loss of -115M Euro

During first 6 months – Standard & Poor’s rating for Nokia A, Moody’s rating A2, Fitch’s rating A 
On last day of office – Standard & Poor’s rating for Nokia junk, Moody’s rating junk, Fitch’s rating junk

On day before Elop announced as new CEO – Nokia share price $9.70
On day before Elop released his Burning Platforms memo – Nokia share price $11.28 (up 16%)
On day before Nokia announces Elop to step down as CEO – Nokia share price $3.90 (down 65%)

NOKIA HANDSET UNIT PERFORMANCE UNDER ELOP

First 6 months – Handset quarterly revenues up 25% from 6.8B Euro
to 8.5B Euro
Next 2.5 years – Handset quarterly revenues down 69% from 8.5B
Euro to 2.6B Euro

First 6 months – Total handsets profit first 6 months 1.8B Euro 
Next 2.5 years – Total handsets loss next 2.5 years 361M Euro

First 6 months – North America quarterly handset volume flat from
2.6M units to 2.6M units
Next 2.5 years – North America quarterly handset volume down 80%
from 2.6M units to 0.5M units

First 6 months – China quarterly handset volume up 13% from 19.3M
units to 21.9M units
Next 2.5 years – China quarterly handset volume down 81% from 21.9M
units to 4.1M units

Nokia handset market share when Elop started – 33%
Nokia handset market share when Elop departed – 14%

Nokia ranking handsets when Elop started – 1st
Nokia ranking handsets when Elop departed – 2nd

Gap to leader when Elop started – Nokia 50% bigger than number 2 (Samsung)
Gap to leader when Elop departed – Samsung 30% bigger than Nokia

This handset unit has now been sold (plus patents and mapping licences) for 5.3B Euro to Microsoft

NOKIA SMARTPHONE DIVISION PERFORMANCE UNDER ELOP

First 6 months – Smartphone quarterly revenues up 29% from 3.4B
Euro to 4.4B Euro
Next 2.5 years – Smartphone quarterly revenues down 73% from 4.4B
Euro to 1.2B Euro

First 6 months – Smartphone quarterly profit up 94% from 283M
Euro to 548M Euro
Next 2.5 years – Smartphone quarterly profit of 548M Euro turned
into loss of -168M Euro

First 6 months – Smartphone quarterly volume up 18% from 24.0M
units to 28.3M units
Next 2.5 years – Smartphone quarterly volume down 74% from 28.3M
units to 7.4M units

Nokia smartphone market share when Elop started – 35%
Nokia smartphone market share when Elop departed – 3%

Nokia ranking smartphones when Elop started – 1st
Nokia ranking smartphones when Elop departed – 9th

Gap to leader when Elop started – twice as big as number 2 (RIM) or number 3 (Apple)
Gap to leader when Elop departed – Samsung smartphones is 12x bigger than Nokia smartphones

Worst CEO ever? You make the call. Was Nokia smartphone unit truly in catastrophic trouble before the Burning Platforms memo? You make the call. Did the Elop Effect turn strong growth into collapse? You make the call.